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JENS Viggo Nielsen (JVN): I imagine that during our conversation we 
will talk a lot about your book, The future of religion•, which will be our 
point of departure today. You have already worked with Gianni Vattimo 
for about ten years. Back in 2003 you edited his book, Nihilism and 
emancipation', and lately you have also published other books together, 
as well as periodicals'. Furthermore, I understand that the next book 
you are doing together will be a co-authored one bearing the title From 
Within. De constructing Capitalism through Globalization•. But you have 
also written about topics "all your own", i.e. about the philosophy of 
Ernst Tugendhat. In short, how would you define your own position, 
as compared to the weak thought of Gianni Vattimo? 
Santiago Zabala (SZ): I do not think I deal with different topics or 
that I have a different position from Vattimo' s. The book you mention on 
Tugendhat'was actually my MA thesis that I worked on for four years at 
the University of Turin under Vattimo's direction. My aim was to show 
how the German philosopher Tugendhat corrected his teacher Heidegger' s 
position. It was published in Italian in 2004, and will also be available 
in English next year. The difference between Vattimo and myself can be 
found in my forthcoming book The Remains of Being', where I develop and, 
in a way, wrote the book Vattimo had planned in 1994 entitled Ontology 
of actuality. He never got down to writing it, although he still talks about 
it as if he did. This book was supposed to explain what is left of Being 
after the deconstruction of metaphysics- an ontology of the current state 
of Being. Although I asked him to write it several times during the past 
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years, he kept on postponing it until he finally told me to do it myself, since 
he perceived I had an idea of what it should look like. Now, Vattimo has 
given lots of indications of what such an ontology of actuality is, not only 
in Beyond Interpretation', but also in Nihilism and Emancipation, but he has 
never systematically formulated it. This is what I've been working on for 
the past 5 years. I finished the book in July, and by August he had several 
comments to make that confirmed that I have really brought his indications 
to the extreme. He was very happy to see how I had developed his ideas, 
but he also found the book very different from the way he would have 
done it: I talk about an "ontology of remnants" with its "remains of Being", 
while he still thinks it should be called an "ontology of actuality" which 
investigates the "event of Being." He also believes that the "projectuality" 
of Dasein is missing in these remains of Being, but I think it is the only 
way to recognize how Being is something given that has been used up, 
but still remains, keeps on remaining. Thus I think to have explained in 
a more persuasive way what he means (perhaps as Tugendhat did with 
Heidegger's philosophy), and the other colleagues that read it, such as 
Jean Grondin, Jeff Malpas, Giacomo Marramao, and John Caputo, think 
I have written a very original work It's under review at Columbia Press 
now and it would take up too much space to continue to explain the 
differences, but as you can see, our differences sum up to the different 
ways of naming Being after the deconstruction of metaphysics. As far as 
the rest is concerned- culture, politics, religion- well, there basically are 
no differences, and this is also why we, together, are writing From Within. 
Deconstructing Capitalism through Globalization. 
JVN: If I have understood you correctly, this next book is political. 
It strikes me that you have been writing it together just recently, and 
as you surely know, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt both write 
political books together. Will your book perhaps discuss their concept 
of "Empire" and their understanding of globalization? Their book 
Empire had a lot of success, and the same goes for their following one, 
Multitude.• Is yours similar? 
SZ: The only similarity is that we are also two authors. As for the 
subject matter, well, I still did not understand (and doubt they understood 
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either) what their book is about. I read both volumes and simply did 
not get much out of it. They have played the old trick of intellectuals, 
which consists in explaining things that could be simple in a confusing 
manner. Furthermore, their categories, "empire" and "multitude", are as 
metaphysical as Plato's: there just is no way to identify where the empire 
is or who the multitude is. We might discuss their books, but we are 
certainly not taking them too seriously. Our book is not just another theory 
of permanent revolutions, but the political project of hermeneutics. The 
general lines of this can be found in Nihilism and Emancipation (which you 
translated so well for us, and we are very grateful) and also in some parts 
of the dialogue in The Future of Religion. The main idea is that the political 
problem today is capitalism, the capitalist system we are all emerged in, 
and the emancipation from this system taking place through globalization. 
It is globalization that allows all the worst consequences of capitalism to 
emerge. This is why the deconstruction of capitalism only can take place 
through globalization. This will inevitably take us all back to a genuine 
socialist politics, because if we check the content of all the criticism that 
this movement does- in relation to the G8, the OMC, the Iraq invasion, US 
hegemony, not to mention multinational corporations- you will find the 
socialist program. To return to your question on Negri and Hardt, what 
they indicate as the "Empire" we simply name it "capitalism." A theory 
that cuts through both of these theories (and a better one at that) can be 
found in Ellen Meiksins Wood's latest book: The Empire of Capital.• 
JVN: Ok, I think we cannot avoid getting back to the question of 
the political implications of weak thought, since this question is also 
present in The future of religion, our main issue today. But as for the 
basic assumptions of weak thought, what do you understand by a "weak 
thought", as seen in the works of Gianni Vattimo and Richard Rorty? 
SZ: Weak thought is thought. It is the recognition of our capacities. 
This is why it is the strongest thought of weak thought because it's the 
only one to know it is weak. Vattimo invented it, while Rorty accepted 
and acquired it to qualify his own work which not only has a pragmatic 
nature, but is also weak, that is - in his vocabulary- contingent. 
JVN: In your book's introduction you state that the future of religion 
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lies in a religion both without atheists and theists. But what role does 
religion then play within weak thought? How are we to understand 
this very concept of "religion", as you see it? 
SZ: It is an invitation to recognize religion as weak also, as limited to 
certain hopes, freedoms, or even as the death of god. The concept works 
well in regards to religion because it helps to see, as we showed in the 
book, that God is not necessary for religion, that you may feel perfectly 
pious without such an image. After all, Christ himself was weak, died 
weak, and even lived in a weak (poor) way ... 
JVN: But why even ask the question of religion today? Do you, 
Vattimo and Rorty think that we do in fact still ask more questions 
about it, or rather that we should do so, but don't? And what role do 
you think that religion is going to play in tomorrow's world? Is there 
any danger whatsoever that religion would not have a future? 
SZ: The question of the future of religion is of great actuality, because 
its tradition or history is essential, and by raising the question of its future, 
one starts to wonder if, as you point out, it has a future. The questions we 
should be asking shouldn't be about religion in itself (God exists? Truth 
of Christ?), which would make us fall back into metaphysics, but rather 
how these questions prevent us from having faith. The more you ask these 
questions, the less faith you will have. Questions in philosophy are always 
welcome as long as they invite us to "pursue the conversation". 
JVN: You also decided to arrange an interview with Rorty and 
Vattimo in Paris back in December 2002. But where did the idea for the 
book come from in the first place? 
SZ: Let us first agree that interviews should always be called dialogues, 
because the one asking the questions already has an idea of the answer 
he will receive, and by choosing certain questions rather than others, he 
is anticipating the answers and, in a way, already answering them. This 
is what hermeneutics is about, and perhaps also the book in itself. The 
idea for the book came to me on February 12th, 2000, when Erwin Teufel, 
Rudiger Bubner, Michael Theunissen, Gianni Vattimo, and Richard Rorty 
were invited to the University of Heidelberg to give talks to celebrate the 
hundredth anniversary of Gadamer 's birth. Although since the early 1980s, 
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Vattimo and Rorty had written several essays and forewords for their 
respective English and Italian editions, Rorty' s conference that day, entitled 
"Being that can be Understood is Language", confirmed not only that his 
neopragmatic philosophy had the same goals as Vattimo' s hermeneutics, 
but also that these two philosophies were weak philosophies, that is, "weak 
thoughts". It was here that I decided they should collaborate and produce 
a book together. Rorty' s conference on Gadamer was the confirmation 
that we are living beyond metaphysics or the traditional dichotomies 
such as truth vs error, science vs religion_ or even, right vs left. It was a 
clear elucidation that we are immersed in a "fusion of horizons" which 
is not an outcome or a final condition, but rather a recognition of our 
weakness, a recognition of this condition. From the beginning, I knew the 
book had to be on religion, but not of religion, in other words, religion 
was only a good pretext to delineate their respective versions of weak 
thought. Perhaps science could have worked well also, but in the end I 
chose religion because its essential problem, as to whether god exist or 
not, was a good example, an example without a solution. 
JVN: So we are dealing with a philosophical book on religion and 
on the future of religion, in which both Rorty and Vattimo represent 
weak thought, and where the point of departure is Gadamer's view on 
the fact that "Being, which can be understood, is language". Speaking of 
Gadamer, will you then explain to us where it is that Vattimo and weak 
thought depart from or disagree with his former teacher's hermeneutical 
elaboration of Heidegger's philosophy? 
SZ: As you probably know, the first translation of Truth and Method was 
the one in Italian by Vattimo. He started it during the sixties in Heidelberg 
while he was writing his PhD under Gadamer. Vattimo and Gadamer had 
a friendly relationship, but since Vattimo was translating his major book, 
they had to discuss on occasion various terminological and grammatical 
issues, which led to real philosophical discussions. Vattimo told me that 
the translation into Italian of Gadamer's most known dictum- "Sein, 
das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache [Being that can be understood is 
language]"- was tricky because if the commas are neglected as they are 
in English and French, then the dictum could be interpreted as identifying 
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too easily the sphere of beings offering themselves to comprehension 
within language. Instead, Vattimo opted for the second possibility, with 
the commas, as in German, because it emphasized that Being is language 
and its characteristic is the possibility of being comprehended. It was 
after the translation that Vattimo began to understand that Gadamer 
continued to be too platonic and metaphysical, protecting the human 
sciences against modern scientism at all costs, mainly because, as he put 
it, he was not "Heideggerian" enough. Gadamer, according to Vattimo, 
never really approved of Heidegger' s critique and destruction of the 
history of ontology, because he never actually understood his famous 
dictum, according to which all "Being is language", as he should have. 
This is what differentiates them regarding the hermeneutical elaboration 
of Heidegger' s philosophy. What Vattimo always approved of in Gadamer 
instead was his version of Hegelian idealism, which had many affinities 
with Benedetto Croce's philosophical interpretation of the history of the 
Spirit. When Vattimo now affirms that "emancipation" is "weakening" 
and that weakening is nothing other than transferring everything into the 
realm of symbolism and simulacrum, he intends this "emancipation" as 
a Hegelian spiritualization without the absolute Spirit or, as we can say, 
without the problem of the existence of God. 
JVN: I have a question relating to the title, which also pertains to the 
relation between Rorty and Vattimo in the book: It almost seems to me 
that the title expresses a kind of paradox- although I'm not sure you will 
agree with me on this, as I perhaps take it too "seriously": According to 
Vattimo, who openly declares himself a "half-believing" Christian, the 
fundamental "Leitfaden" of weak thought is the appropriation of tradition 
and therefore also of the past event of incarnation. To Rorty, on the other 
hand, the ideas of charity and solidarity as they were propagated by the 
French revolution, and in the Rorty's liberal hope, belongs to the future 
understood as a distant utopia. Rorty also argues in the book that he is not 
impressed with Vattimo's distinction between before and after the birth 
of Jesus. In other words: Is there not, after all, an important difference 
between the two, precisely in their different views on religion and on the 
"fulfilment of time", and this in spite of the many similarities? 
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SZ: You raise here a fundamental question which could easily induce 
lots of readers to criticize this volume as opportunistic, but if such concern 
arises it is because there is also something that links everything together. 
Firstly, we should remember that this is an edited book, which means 
that the editor decided to produce such a book with material which 
was not his, that belongs to others. Having said this, let us also note, as 
Derrida used to say, that the author comes after the text, and not before. 
In other words, there is a certain understanding of religion that comes 
from the book regardless of its authors. Such an understanding is also 
that "something" I just referred to, and which links it all together. On 
the one hand, Vattimo and Rorty both agree that the future of religion 
(the understanding) may only exist without the concern regarding the 
existence of God, and on the other, that "solidarity, charity, and irony" 
(the so-called "something") represent the best possibility of what religion 
should be about. Those differences between Vattimo and Rorty you 
mention are dissolved, or better, they loose their significance, because 
they both reach this conclusion. It is not important that one uses Croce 
and the other Dewey, what is more significant is that these two different 
philosophical traditions, narrations, or conversations, achieve a goal that 
enables both to reproduce their own tradition. It is only by conversing 
with the other tradition that your own will acquire the proper respect 
and continue to live on. The paradox you mention certainly exists and is 
valuable, but their difference on religion depends on how to live it, not 
how to understand it. 
JVN: But doesn't Rorty's statement on his own "non-musicality" 
in religious matters raise a certain justified doubt also as to the very 
"existence of God", or, at least, of the Christian God? Or is this 
question simply too metaphysical? 
SZ: It's too metaphysical, but this does not mean it's not significant. 
Metaphysics is very significant, actually it's the most significant aspect 
of philosophy, but this does riot mean we still have to believe in it or use 
it for our practices. The problem is whether we expect a metaphysical 
response too. Rorty' s answer to this question is that he just does not feel 
it, but not feeling it not necessarily implies its non-existence. Also, doubt 
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is a constitutive part of the same category of belief, one cannot believe 
without doubt; the idea now, or the future of religion, is that doubt prevails 
over certainty, leaving an open space. This open space allows other beliefs 
to take part in the debate and, sometimes, transforms the debate into a 
conversation. Rorty would be more interested in keeping the debate of 
the conversation open, rather than in convincing others also to become 
tone-deaf regarding religious matters. 
JVN: Here, I come to think of a current issue, even if you have already 
drawn attention to the fact that the book is not simply a book on religion 
but also on other issues such as the role of science: In a certain passage 
in the conversation of the book, Rorty states that, in his opinion, a 
dialogue with Islam does not make sense. Is this also your opinion and 
the opinion of Vattimo? And by the way, what do you think of pope 
Ratzinger's latest statements calling Islam an "irrational" religion, as 
opposed to Christianity which, according to him, is "rational"? 
SZ: Rorty's statement might seem quite radical coming from a liberal, 
but you must also note when the dialogue took place: it was in December 
2002, that is, just at the start of Bush's dictatorial war and the indoctrination 
campaign we were all under. Most television networks were, and still 
are, insisting that democracy had to be exported, that we had to take our 
"freedom" to them. Now; I fully agree with Rorty that there is no need of a 
dialogue if this means a dialogue between Bin Laden and Bush (since they 
are essentially the same person), or even if we consider the dialogue as a 
way to persuade them (as the mission "enduring freedom"). A dialogue 
might still be nice, but it's not useful if the goal of this dialogue is a forced, 
constricted and obligatory one. If they do not want our democracy, why 
should we impose it on them? They certainly know all about it, and if 
I were them, I would surely stay as far away as possible from it. In this 
light, Rorty's words should be understood as an invitation to moderation 
regarding the capacities of dialogue to produce solutions: if we do not 
dialogue, nothing terrible will happen. Democratic revolutions occur 
from within, not from the exterior. Here is where the new Pope comes 
in. I think Ratzinger was trying to project that victim image that his 
predecessor had, and he certainly was successful in creating a scandal 
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in a very clever way. Of course, the fact that I admire his ability to create 
a scandal in his own favour (most Catholics now even fear for his life) 
does not mean I agree with him in the slightest. On the contrary, I'm quite 
worried about the danger he is provoking for all the Catholics living in 
Muslim countries. As far as the distinction he makes between rational and 
irrational, well, what can I say? I believe that the scandal surrounding 
this distinction is a symptom of fear, insecurity, and anxiety. The Pope 
is much more afraid of all those half believers, as Vattimo calls himself, 
than of the few Islamic fundamentalists that our television networks 
deliberately choose to indoctrinate us with. We must remember that the 
Vatican is in a deep crisis of followers, not only with lay ones, but also in 
the priesthood; if you walk through Rome you will note the amount of 
priests that come from Africa or South America. This is not a bad thing, 
I'm happy about it, but the Vatican isn't. An example of this is the fact that 
they chose a German Pope. Why would they choose a South American 
Pope (as most newspapers thought they would) if in South America they 
have so many followers? It's just useless. Instead, a Pope from Germany, 
they thought, will help Europe's Catholics. They are much more afraid of 
our secularization than of the clash between civilizations, but since they 
think such a clash might bring back lots of followers, they go on, allying 
themselves with Bush, and representing themselves as victims. But the 
only way they can bring back those "lost" followers would be by becoming 
Christians again, because as Hans Kling once said, it is just impossible 
that God believes in the Vatican! 
JVN: Earlier, you spoke of Rorty's and Vattimo's philosophies as 
"narrations", but if philosophy- and this means the interpretation of 
hermeneutics- consists of narrations, what then, in your opinion, is the 
difference between, for instance, philosophy and literature? 
SZ: What I meant by "philosophical views as narrations" was only to 
distinguish these views from traditional views of philosophy as systems 
of truth. It seems hard to call a system of truth, as Kant tried to establish, 
a narration as any other, because Kant, as so many philosophers until 
Heidegger, always thought they were the last one writing. A narrator is 
something weaker. This is why Rorty once said that "philosophy books 
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should be, in the future, less pretentious, less professionalized, less priggish, 
less guarded, funnier, more poetic, and perhaps more sexier than those of 
the past." The difference is the same difference there is between science 
and literature, or philosophy and science. Is science a form of iterature? 
In a certain way it is. Is philosophy a form of science? Sometimes it is. It is 
more a difference of the recognition of its own limits, than of the objects it 
investigates. Philosophy, at least in its traditional aspect, is ontology- that 
is, the investigation of Being. But such investigation is nothing more than 
the repetition of a question which presupposes all other questions, while 
science and literature live within themselves. Science, most of the time, 
as Heidegger says, does not think. But it does not need to think, because 
thought is unnecessary for the correct function of scientific procedures. 
The difference lies in a wider recognition of its "limits", which we may 
also call "presuppositions" or simply "thought." 
JVN: Your answer makes me think of Dialogue with Nietzsche, 
where Vattimo, in an essay from 1994, launches a criticism or correction 
of Rorty's "aesthetic" reading of Nietzsche and, indirectly, of his theory 
of the redescription of the world." Do you think that Vattimo would 
still maintain, even today, that Rorty does not properly consider the 
question of Being? 
SZ: Considering the question of Being, the fundamental problem of 
philosophy is not a matrix to evaluate a philosopher's significance. Some 
have worked on it, others have not, but what is important is whether this 
problem is pursued. Perhaps Rorty did not pursue this problem recently, 
but he certainly did in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", where the 
criticism of Being as a mirror or essence is indirectly discussed. We could 
also say that Vattimo does not deal with the problem of Being in his recent 
works on religion or politics, but just as Rorty's works on social justice 
and culture, it depends on his previous analysis of Being. 
JVN: But doesn't a relaxed and ironic position, such as the one of 
weak thought, or the fact that we, in the western world - and here I 
quote what Vattimo stated in a Danish newspaper interview two years 
ago -, who no longer believe neither in truth nor in our own ideals, 
always entail the risk of becoming a "Besserwisser", or even in an 
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indirect manner, of imposing a kind of "cultural imperialism" on the 
very cultures that we want to dialogue with on their own terms? Is 
there any way in which we can finally vaccinate ourselves against the 
possibility that even the principle of the weakening of strong principles 
can enact a kind of "violence" in relation to people who think or feel 
differently from ourselves? 
SZ: Here you raise another essential point that is often criticized in 
all philosophical theories that overcome metaphysics. Overcoming some 
belief or foundation does not mean to forget about it. On the contrary, it 
means to appropriate it, to understand it in a way that will not exarcebate 
those issues for which you decided to overcome it in the first place. Here, 
irony helps. The point is that weak thought helps to overcome these 
ideologies or beliefs in such a way that they will continue to be with us, 
leaving space for other beliefs. It's like the mechanism of Freud's analysis: 
the therapy will not help the patient to forget all the problems; on the 
contrary, it will show him how these problems are part of his nature and 
how he can begin to live with them. Also, weak thought and strong thought 
should not be opposed as poles of two different thoughts because it would 
be like opposing analytical philosophy to continental philosophy, or God's 
existence to his non-existence, good cultures to bad ones. Instead, weak 
thought is the strongest one because it knows it is weak, and this is also 
why ii insists on interpretation rather than description, or on Heidegger 
and Gadamer rather than Carnap and Quine. In your question, you also 
ask what assurances we have that weak thought will not create any 
violence. This is just as with the first part of your question: weakening 
dogmatic belief is like secularization - it never stops, it just continues 
because there will always be other principles to weaken, just as today, 
there are still so many things we still need to secularize. 
JVN: Both Rorty and Vattimo have written in detail on irony, and in 
Denmark we have Saren Kierkegaard, who in 1841 wrote his doctoral 
thesis exactly on this subject, On the Concept of Irony. In this book 
Kierkegaard underscores - continuing on from Socrates and Hegel, 
but definitely also in contrast with Hegel - that irony necessarily 
implicates an "infinite, subjective negativity", and also that irony always 
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ends up biting its own tail: In Kierkegaard's opinion, irony is just as 
hard to represent as "the god Mars with the armour that makes him 
invisible". Well, this (ironic) definition of irony seems to me to resemble 
the definition of weak thought- here, I am thinking of the Nietzsche-
inspired statement in Vattimo, according to which (I quote by memory), 
"Everything is an interpretation, and also this statement, which says 
that everything is an interpretation, is itself in turn an interpretation!" 
My question here is, if irony does not necessarily include a dimension 
of subjectivity, and if not in a strong, then at least in a weakened sense 
of the word? In Vocazione e responsabilita del filosofo, and even before 
that in Credere di credere", Vattimo confronts the issue of the "personal" 
in his (re)tum towards Christianity, and as I said, it seems to me that 
he, at least to some degree, has approached Kierkegaard's view of and 
practice of irony. 
SZ: This is a very difficult question. In order to attach Kierkegaard to 
Vattimo we would need to pass through Heidegger's existential apparatus, 
but irony does not have a place in this apparatus- that is, in the first section 
of Being and Time. I cannot comment on Kierkegaard' s influences because 
they are just too abundant and the space we have is limited. I would 
like instead to comment on the subjectivity of irony. Just as metaphysics 
cannot be overcome completely, a remain (Vattimo would say" an event") 
of subjectivity would be leftover. I do not think there is any foundation 
in irony or any subjectivity in it. Thus, every time we use it, it's also to 
bring to the fore our own existence even if it's only to show how weak it 
is, and perhaps it's only to show its weakness. The point is, coming back 
to the "assistance of irony" I mentioned above, that irony is something 
that can help us stand the oppression of truth. Truth can only appear as an 
oppression, as a violence we must accept because it's the end, the truth. 
This is why the book insists so much on irony because a future of religion 
where irony plays a significant role will enable us to leave the so called 
"end of times" aside, even if such an end will occur. 
JVN: Manfred Frank, one of the contributors of Weakening 
Philosophy", has defended the view that without subjectivity, without a 
consciousness, which cannot be reduced to langue, the social or history, 
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then it also becomes impossible to found human rights, and in the end 
we will eventually end up in totalitarianism. What do you think of this 
viewpoint? 
SZ: Yes, Professor Frank is one of the most important European 
philosophers and also a good friend of mine. He very much enjoyed my 
book on Tugendhat and also accepted my invitation to participate in my 
volume for Vattimo's seventieth birthday. His opinion on consciousness 
comes from his adherence to the so-called "school of Heidelberg" (Dieter 
Henrich, Konrad Cramer, Ulrich Pothast), who have worked towards a 
rehabilitation of Cartesian subjectivity. I also agree that it is impossible 
to found human rights, but I do not see why such impossibility will 
automatically produce totalitarianism. We already went through 
totalitarianism and perhaps some administrations today, such as Bush's 
and Blair's, are behaving in a totalitarian way, but I see things in a different 
perspective. A clear subjectivity or consciousness will only assure with 
higher emphasis a foundation: they were so sure that Saddam had 
biological weapons (their own, since the US was the first supplier in the 
1980s), that they had the "right" to intervene. If a doubt had prevailed, as 
it did in the consciousness of the majority of the population on this planet, 
they would have been forced not to attack. I do not think that doubt, or, 
in philosophical terms, relativism, contingency, and weakness, contrary 
to subjectivity or consciousness, will produce totalitarianism; I think the 
opposite is much more likely. 
JVN: Then we come to Christianity and its relation to truth: Weak 
thought's own understanding of Christianity often takes as its point of 
departure the famous Benedetto Croce quote, "Why we cannot not call 
ourselves Christians", just as it often refers to another, and seemingly 
contrary, popular Italian saying,"Thank God I'm an atheist!" Can you 
please explain how these two sentences relate to each other? 
SZ: Both propositions are really just ways of explaining, again, how 
it is impossible to overcome metaphysics. On the one hand, Croce 
reminds us philosophers that there cannot be any "philosophy" which is 
not Christian: all Greek philosophy was transmitted to us through that 
tradition which must inevitably be called Christian. On the other hand., 
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the second proposition just confirms that atheism is an internal response to 
theism- that is, a strong secularization is only possible in a strong theistic 
tradition like ours (and every tradition). These two sentences relate to 
each other because they are both directed against those intellectuals such 
as Bertrand Russell, who thought he was able to do without that same 
tradition which constituted his own work - and I should also add, his 
own mathematical work. These are the worst kinds of attack the Vatican 
can receive because they imply that the Vatican itself has contributed to 
producing this lay and secularized culture we are so proud of. 
JVN: In Denmark it has been argued by some reviewers, with 
whom I myself tend to agree, that Vattimo, in his essay on "Pain and 
metaphysics" in Nihilism and emancipation, might seem to cut away 
an important part of Christianity: can there be a sense of guilt without 
(at least some) pain involved, and can there be a sense of "sin" without 
a sense of guilt? Is the Christian concept of sin, as you see it, and here 
also its mental "collateral" - anxiety - so to speak, solely a cause for 
(psychic) violence, or could it also exert a more positive function? 
SZ: It is difficult to argue with these distinguished reviewers on such 
a delicate and complex matter, but I will try to answer employing the 
only way beyond pain and violence, that is, by weakening them. I'm 
not sure if it is possible to discuss this realm of consciousness (guilt, sin, 
anxiety) as a platform as Christianity tries to do. I think psychologists 
have explained that it's more a matter of different responses to contingent 
personal histories that must be reconstructed. We are all constituted 
very differently psychically because we all have a different history, and 
the way guilt is felt in one Christian may be very different from another 
Christian who has been educated just like him. The point is that guilt may 
have any origin, but what is important is how such origin is considered. 
Let's imagine I feel guilty because the Pope had told me not to vote for 
politicians that promote euthanasia (as in Italy this week) and I went on 
to vote for them. This guilt is just as legitimate as the opposite one, hence, 
that I did not vote for these politicians because I followed the Pope's 
advice. The fact that if at the origin there is a Christian sin or a secular 
one does not matter; the important thing is that on both occasions, the 
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legitimate pain is weakened - that is, it is recognized in its contingent 
foundation. Here comes into play the "positive function" you mention. 
Once I recognize its origin, foundation, or authority (the Pope) it will be 
weakened and I will understand its particular condition. This is what 
therapy is all about, but not only therapy- it is also supposed to be the 
goal of a sincere priest; after all, they are supposed to absolve us from our 
sins, not to condemn us. 
JVN: A last a question on religion and Christianity: why does weak 
thought not like the idea of God as a transcendent being? Can you 
not easily imagine a position which would be both ironic - and even 
self-ironic- and at the same time understand incarnation as a paradox? 
First and foremost, I am here referring again to Kierkegaard, whose 
"weak transcendence" you cannot possibly compare to the dogmatic 
transcendentalism of the pope and the church: in fact, Kierkegaard too 
emphasises the same thing you said earlier- that is, that belief and doubt 
hang together, that one cannot be without the other, and that the relation 
with God can only be part of our historical"projectuality". Conversely, 
Kierkegaard might have wanted to ask of weak thought, with its idea of 
kenosis: can one really become "friends" with Jesus without any "fear 
and trembling"? Will Jesus not always somehow remain a skandalon 
that "transcends" our everyday experience, or all the "language games" 
that each and every one of us takes part in? 
SZ: Your question inevitably invites everyone interested in weak 
thought to investigate the relation between Vattimo's and Kierkegaard's 
understanding of faith. I wish I could engage in such research, but my 
investigations are now concentrated on other issues. But this does not 
mean that it should not be done, and Gianni Vattimo and I would be most 
interested in supporting it. I do not think weak thought is incompatible 
with the transcendent idea of God- we just see it as potentially oppressive 
and dangerous, but we would not perceive its unavailability as a danger. 
This may even be the only idea or vision we can extract from tradition, 
but the point is that once we really extract it, we recognize that it's pretty 
weak, contingent, etc. What is left of this transcendent idea? Not much. We 
all know that there are very few American soldiers that actually believe 
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God gave Bush a mission, or that the Islamist kamikaze are actually 
following their faith in their self-destructive actions. It's more a matter 
of political indoctrination or necessity that motivates them- the religious 
aspect is just a cover created for us. As for becoming friends with Jesus 
without "fear and trembling"? I think it should be the opposite; it's Jesus 
that would be in fear and trembling if he tried to become our friend. 
He would probably say: "What have you become?" He may always 
remain, as you say, a skandalon, but only because this is how he has been 
transmitted to us. Our own tradition is inevitably a reconsideration of an 
event, incarnation, but more important than the existence of such event, 
is its significance today. Perhaps a way to retrieve its significance today is 
through an emphasis on Kierkegaard' s Jesus, which is much more faithful 
than Pope Ratzinger's Jesus. 
JVN: I would now like to ask you some questions about weak 
thought and its relation to society and politics: Vattimo is one of the 
philosophers who still speaks of post-modernity. You just spoke about 
"overcoming" and "recollecting" or "appropriating" metaphysics at one 
and the same time. Can you briefly explain why weak thought on one 
hand speaks of "overcoming" modernity, and on the other hand, refuses 
the idea of moving beyond modernity? Don't the notions "beyond" 
and "overcoming" easily lead to the misunderstanding that modernity 
is something which has to be "overcome" once and for all, whereas the 
idea of weak thought - cf. Heideggers concept, not of Dberwindung, 
but of Verwindung - is that we can only, as you say, surpass it or learn 
how we might live with and within modernity? 
SZ: Vattimo is only one of many philosophers (Derrida, Rorty, 
Baudrillard, Beck) that discuss postmodernity and believe that we are in 
the postmodern condition. Yes, overcoming and appropriating metaphysics 
are the same thing, or more precisely, they are the same thing if we follow 
Heidegger's indications where he says that metaphysics should not be 
"overcome" ( iiberwinden), but "surpassed" ( verwinden). The difference lies 
in the idea that, just as a mental problem is never solved once and for all, 
neither is it forgotten, or discarded But how can we really overcome a 
problem such as "violence"? The only way to do so is by recognizing its 
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existence and weakening it, to appropriate it as something we have to live 
with. Modernity is as useful as the idea of God; should we cancel the last 
3000 years of Christianity? Or should we recognize its positive force and 
continue to use it as we wish? As far as Freud is concerned, it's better to 
recognize the problems in order to live with them in such a way that they 
do not halt us from our practices: this is the meaning of the "post" before 
"modernity". It might come after, but as a part of it, as its own part. 
JVN: But where, then, is the difference to Habermas when he speaks 
of late-modernity and of modernity understood as an unfinished project? 
Is it, as it were, the inherent truth-potential of communication which is 
the difference, because Habermas actually believes that "in principle", 
the project of modernity can be concluded? 
SZ: I'm not a big fan of Habermas because, as you correctly point 
out, he still believes in a complete emancipation. We do not believe it is 
possible because it would presuppose the end point, the complete freedom, 
but once such a state is reached, new emancipative necessities will come 
about. Moreover, there are only unfinished projects; not even Hegel could 
be seriously conceived of as the constructor of a finished system: perhaps 
he thought so, but at the end, the number of ways to see flaws in it are 
enormous. Perhaps the only emancipation is recognizing how far away 
we actually are from emancipation. 
JVN: Speaking of the possibility of emancipation and violence: 
In an essay on Pareyson and Vattimo published in Denmark, Alberto 
Siclari has stated against weak thought that violence is more "real" than 
this line of thinking is prone to accept." But on the other hand Vattimo 
himself underscores that of course there are "facts", whose existence it 
is useless to discuss. I am here referring to your Nihilism and religion 
published last year, where Vattimo says that if I go outside and actually 
get wet, then it is of course useless to deny that it is raining! Furthermore, 
back in 2004, Vattimo wrote in 11 Manifesto that he had changed his 
mind, and that this change is attested in his renewed interest in Marx and 
socialism: "What is now needed", Vattimo said, "is a stronger version of 
weak thought". Now, my question is: Doesn't violence- that is, the war 
in Iraq and the capitalism that you write about in your upcoming book 
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-constitute such a fact or just a form of reality "out there", which we 
could of course try to eliminate, but the existence of which we cannot 
possibly deny? To state it differently, was it perhaps the wish to combat 
violence that brought VaUimo to redefine a "stronger" and more political 
version of weak thought as compared to earlier? 
SZ: I would urge Alberto Siclari to read carefully what weak thought is 
about before making such a statement, because it just does not stand; after 
all, we are dealing here with a thought which is a response to violence. It 
is a response to the objectivity of violence. I explain in detail how Vattimo 
came up with it in my introduction to Weakening Philosophy. It was really 
a response to the Red Brigade's violence with which, incidentally, they 
even threatened him during the 1970s for not being revolutionary enough. 
Hermeneutics, weak thought's philosophy, will not debate the fact that if it 
is raining then you will get wet; but to just argue that the amount of ways 
to explain whether it's raining or not are so numerous, the fact that it is 
raining will then become pointless. Regarding the stronger version of weak 
thought, It has nothing to do with facts out there. These facts will always 
exist. The point is to appropriate them without becoming them, without 
becoming part of the machine that we are working with. I agree with you 
that the existence of realities such as violence, military occupations, or 
that corporate systems are out there, but this should not confound weak 
thought. A stronger weak thought means an increase of its recognition 
or emphasis in other subject areas. We are perhaps now working on From 
Within" for this reason you point out, hence its political call, but others have 
done this already. I'm here referring to Rorty's Achieving Our Country," 
which is an elaborate call to reconsider the ideological hope of the left 
and to stick with moderate and active emancipation. 
JVN: Vattimo does not entirely endorse the commandment that you 
should always turn the other cheek to your enemy: in Nihilism and 
Religion he distinguishes between "pacifism" and "pacification", and 
explains that pacification does not exclude the possibility of slapping 
an intruder in the face in order to stop this intrusion from taking place. 
Furthermore, in Nihilism and emancipation he states that, if necessary, 
you should not hesitate to use naval force against the human smugglers 
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in the middle sea and even open fire on their crafts in order to combat 
such criminals profiting from people's misery. In other words, the 
goal must be to weaken violence as much as possible. But is there 
not a risk here, in the sense that this very aim can become so elastic 
in its definition, that it looses all its critical potential? Will not every 
government always be able to endorse this definition applying it ad 
hoc, or perhaps rather "assimilating" it ad hoc? Will governments not 
always try to argue that what they are actually attempting is to weaken 
violence "as much as possible", for example when they claim that if 
we do not secure energy resources in the middle east now, then later 
on "we" (i.e. "they") would have to use much more (military) force in 
order to gain access to them? 
SZ: Regarding the example of using the navy to open fire on smugglers, 
we should specify what Vattimo meant. During the years he wrote the 
essays, Umberto Bossi, the leader of one of the most racist parties in Italy, 
"Lega Nord", thought it would be a good idea to sink all ships arriving 
with poor immigrants. This is not Vattimo' s opinion. One thing is to sink 
a boat full of immigrants (which is not our opinion) another is to open 
fire on the criminals that ruin the lives of the immigrants by risking their 
lives, often just leaving them in the middle of the sea. Coming back to 
your question, I do not think that weakening violence entails a risk of 
loosing its critical power because today, our governments have lost any 
consent in their operations. They might sell their operations as a pre-
emptive attack or a way for securing our so called freedom, but we all 
know very well they are selling us capitalist lies. What you call" securing 
energy sources" should rather be translated by "occupying", "stealing", or 
even "hijacking", because what our governments are doing in the middle 
east represents the worst atrocities seen since what the Nazi's did to the 
Jews or the US to South Vietnam. Your question could seem to imply that 
governments are already using weak thought, but I think that if only one 
of them started to, it would consist in the beginning of a recognition of 
how other people have the same rights us, that is, the "rights" that the 
US does not see in any other country except itself. 
JVN: One last question about the politics of weak thought: does Rorty 
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really agree with VaUimo on this criticism of the USA? And what does 
the concrete proposal of a progressive and altemative global politics 
look like according to weak thought? Is there any altemative at all to the 
present world order? And what has to be done in practical terms in order 
to get there? 
SZ: This is a question we are working on in our new book (From Within) 
and it would take too long to answer it fully here. Let me just say that 
Rorty certainly agrees with the criticism as long as we remember that the 
criticism is only of the establishment, not of the American people. If Italy 
or France had the military power that the US has, they would probably 
behave similarly - Britain certainly did in the last century. As for the 
second part of your question, I would just say that our political order 
today is based on an empire of capital that functions following the rules 
of those state's hierarchies, which we inherited from the winners of the 
second world war. Socialism is the future of our political order because 
no one wants the richer people to become the only educated class of the 
planet. This is why North Korea and Iran should ally with China in order 
to create another balance as we had during the cold war because today, 
with only one power, the war is hot, too hot, if we consider that less 
people died during Saddam Hussein's regime than in these past years 
of occupation. 
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